Special feature

Mobility and agency in protracted displacement

In a special feature published in Forced Migration Review issue 68, researchers from the **Transnational Figurations of Displacement** (TRAFIG https://trafig.eu/) research project examine the role of people's mobility and agency in protracted displacement. Through a number of case-studies from a range of countries, they explore how displaced persons' mobility and their translocal networks can provide important resources in their search for durable solutions.

The five articles in this feature are available online in PDF and HTML formats in English, Arabic and French. The full issue of FMR in which this feature appears is also available in print in English, free of charge. Sign up for FMR email notifications about new issues and forthcoming themes at **www.fmreview.org/request/alerts**.

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Bada Admagug, in Afar State, Ethiopia. This is a central transport hub close to an irregular border crossing point with Eritrea. From here, goods and people move across the border and within the region.

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Understanding the dynamics of protracted displacement

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Displaced persons' mobility and their translocal networks can provide important resources in the search for durable solutions.

Almost 20 years ago, UNHCR coined the term 'protracted refugee situations' to draw attention to the plight of refugees in extended exile and to promote durable solutions. However, the search for solutions for persons in longer-term displacement has been at the heart of the international refugee protection regime ever since its beginnings in the early 1920s. What is more, in several major crises of displacement, mobility options have been a major component of successful strategies to resolve these situations. The emergence of a new term thus highlighted, more than anything else, the failure of the international protection regime to deliver a key promise, namely that displaced persons should be able to regain a degree of normality and to rebuild their lives.

Previous research and policy debates[1] have largely focused on protracted displacement as a policy problem while paying less attention to how displaced persons themselves can shape the conditions of protracted displacement. It is the potential for 'solutions from below' that is the focus of the research project 'Transnational figurations of displacement' (TRAFIG) on which the five articles in this mini-feature are based.[2] In this article, we revisit the concept of protracted displacement and link our understanding of the concept to individuals' agency, understood both in terms of their capability to act and in terms of actual behaviour. Our research has a strong focus on mobility as one expression of displaced persons' agency. Reflecting on historical examples, we examine the role of mobility as a resource for people caught in protracted displacement and as a possible avenue for political solutions to protracted displacement. We end with a brief reflection of the role of current policy approaches in promoting or, indeed, stalling solutions.

Revisiting the concept

In 2004, UNHCR's Executive Committee presented a paper on protracted refugee situations in which it described a protracted refugee situation as "one in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo".[3] The concept was widely taken up and subsequently also applied to other categories of displacement, giving rise to the broader term 'protracted displacement'.

The concept highlights two aspects of contemporary displacement. Firstly, and reflecting the protracted nature both of conflicts and of persecution in countries of origin, the term simply highlights that exile often extends for many years. Secondly, and more importantly, the notion of protracted displacement emphasises that many displaced persons remain in precarious situations for prolonged periods of time after becoming displaced (in terms of legal status, access to rights and their ability to rebuild their lives), that is, without finding a 'durable solution' to their situation. UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as "one in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more in a given asylum country". At the end of 2020, some 15.7 million refugees or 76% of the global refugee population were in a situation of protracted displacement, of which a large majority had endured for 10 years or longer.[4] No comparable figures are available for internal displacement. While useful as a broad indication of the scale of the problem, the statistical definition conceals that it is the long-term absence of solutions (rather than the mere duration of exile) that keeps people in protracted displacement. In addition, the statistical concept also does not capture the dynamics of individual

protracted refugee situations. Thus, while the Afghan situation has endured for more than four decades, there have been large-scale returns and new displacements, while individual refugees have often experienced displacement on a recurrent basis.

Reconceptualising protracted displacement

In FMR's 2009 issue on protracted displacement, Gil Loescher and James Milner observed that "protracted refugee situations are the combined result of the prevailing situations in the country of origin, the policy responses of the country of asylum, and the lack of sufficient engagement in these situations by a range of other actors".[5] While this broad observation still holds true today, it is helpful to examine the more structural forces at play in producing protracted displacement. In our view, these go beyond the conditions in the origin and host countries and the role of other actors in engaging with origin and host countries. Rather, protracted displacement should be viewed as the result of three forces: displacing forces, marginalising forces and immobilising forces. This conception mirrors but is not entirely equivalent to the conventional triad of durable solutions (repatriation, local integration and resettlement) promoted by UNHCR, with their respective association with countries of origin, host countries and third countries.

Displacing forces prevent displaced persons from returning and such forces are present in the country or region of origin and can also be active in first, second and further host countries or regions. Marginalising forces effectively block local integration and operate in the country or region of current stay, whereas immobilising forces hinder (onward) mobility and are at play in the country or region of origin, as well as in transit and host countries.[6]

This conception of protracted displacement allows us to understand protracted displacement as a situation shaped by the dynamic between structural forces and displaced people's agency. In so doing, we suggest moving beyond traditional understandings of protracted displacement as being 'stuck' and as involuntary immobility,

that is, an image of protracted displacement often associated with large refugee camps such as Za'atari in Jordan or Dadaab or Kakuma in Northern Kenya. One should not confuse being trapped or stuck with physical immobility. Indeed, our concept of protracted displacement also captures displaced people on the move who have moved elsewhere from a first host country or region, in an attempt to cope with the situation – as a strategy to find a solution which works at an individual or, more often, a household level.

Displacing forces are not only to be located in the country of origin but in receiving contexts too. In addition, we highlight the combined impact of marginalisation and immobilisation in receiving contexts in preventing displaced persons from finding a 'durable solution' and indeed locking them in a precarious situation. Our conception stresses the need to take a multi-level and transnational approach to refugee protection and to re-focus attention on solutions. Protection from physical harm and persecution is simply not enough. The main impetus for this is to shed light on the role that displaced persons themselves play in coping with displacement, whether or not the solutions they find for themselves are supported by policies designed to help them, or are in fact (and more often) irrespective of and sometimes despite such policies. Refugees' mobilities and translocal connections are an example of such strategies. In the following section, we briefly revisit historical examples of solution strategies capitalising on refugees' own resources and promoting refugees' mobility.

Learning from the past[7]

Fritjof Nansen was appointed first High Commissioner for Refugees in 1921 to address the long-term situation of Russian refugees, and later also Armenian and other refugee groups. The combination of impossibility of return and the poor economic conditions in many first countries of asylum, plus his office's own slim resources, led Nansen to place a strong emphasis on mobility and enabling refugees to travel to where there were jobs. The main instrument to do so was a new travel document for refugees, the 'Nansen passport'.

International NGO staff talking with Syrian refugees living in section 6 of Za'atari refugee camp in Jordan.

Subsequently, his efforts were supported by a job placement scheme operated by the International Labour Office, under which some 60,000 refugees found employment. But it was really the combination of a) employment demand, b) a travel document enabling refugees to be mobile, and c) some institutional support that enabled the success of Nansen's initiative and brought down high levels of unemployment among refugees.

After World War II, employment-driven resettlement played an even bigger role in providing solutions to displacement, and continued to take place until the 1960s. While these programmes were not unproblematic and were only made possible by a favourable economic climate and a peak in labour recruitment, they highlight the potential of mobility options in resolving protracted refugee situations. A key contrast between post-War resettlement and Nansen's support for refugees' mobility in the interwar period is the greater and almost exclusive reliance on State-led resettlement supported by a considerable infrastructure provided by international organisations. Today the opportunities for mobility are much more limited, reflected in limited resettlement opportunities but also in restrictions on family reunification and more limited opportunities for labour migration.

Conclusions

Mobility has always been an important element in the solutions available to address protracted displacement. As some of the other articles in this feature show, mobility is a highly important coping strategy for individuals, often in defiance of existing policies. The recent emphasis in the New York Declaration and the Global Compact on Refugees on complementary pathways to protection reflects an increasing awareness of the role of physical mobility in promoting 'durable solutions'. At the same time, there are severe contradictions in the policies of key receiving States. In the European context, for example, the EU emphasises the need to facilitate access to durable solutions and enhance the self-reliance of displaced populations, for instance by improving the link between humanitarian and development assistance. And yet the EU promotes policies that attempt to address the root causes of displacement and irregular migration largely through the use of deterrence. Similarly, the EU's support for regional integration and free movement regimes enhances access to mobility as a livelihood strategy which is, at the same time, limited by the EU's externalisation policies that demand third countries' compliance with migration control conditions in exchange for support.[8]

In sum, there is a need to both refocus policies relating to international protection in general and protracted displacement in particular on protection outcomes, and to assess the 'fitness' of policies according to their capacity to promote durable solutions.

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1. See FMR issue33 (2009) for a snapshot of debates more than a decade ago www.fmreview.org/protracted

2. The project has received generous funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant No 822453. More information on the project is available at www.trafig.eu.

3. bit.ly/EXCOM-2004-protracted

4. UNHCR (2021) *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2020* www.unhcr.org/60b638e37/unhcr-global-trends-2020, p20. In 2017, some 22% of the then protracted refugee situations had lasted more than 38 years, and 51% between 10 and 38 years. Calculated from UNHCR (2018) *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017* bit.ly/UNHCR-GlobalTrends2017 p22

5. Loescher G and Milner J (2009) 'Understanding the Challenge', *Forced Migration Review* issue 33 www.fmreview.org/protracted/loescher-milner

6. Etzold B, Belloni M, King R, Kraler A and Pastore F (2019) 'Transnational Figurations of Displacement: Conceptualising protracted displacement and translocal connectivity through a process-oriented perspective', TRAFIG working paper No 1. BICC, p2–25. bit.ly/TRAFIG-WP1-2019

7. This section is based on Kraler A, Fourer M, Knudsen A, Kwaks J, Mielke K, Noack M, Tobin S and Wilson C (2020) 'Learning from the Past: Protracted displacement in the post-World War II period', TRAFIG working paper No 2. Bonn: BICC. https://trafig.eu/output/working-papers/trafig-working-paper-no-2

8. Ferreira F et al (2020) 'Governing protracted displacement: An analysis across global, regional and domestic contexts', TRAFIG Working Paper No 3, BICC, p38 bit.ly/TRAFIG-WP3-2020: see also main feature on Externalisation in Forced Migration Review issue 68 www.fmreview.org/externalisation.

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Mobility dynamics in protracted displacement: Eritreans and Congolese on the move

Carolien Jacobs and Markus Rudolf

Millions of Eritreans and Congolese find themselves in situations of protracted displacement. A more nuanced understanding of how physical and social mobility affects their daily lives is crucial to developing more effective tailor-made interventions.

The most widely used definition of protracted displacement is UNHCR's term for people who are 'stuck' in a particular place for at least five years. This stresses the static elements of protracted displacement but when such displacement is examined more closely, different patterns of mobility and immobility of individuals become visible. This article draws on empirical findings relating to Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in order to explore different physical and social mobilities.

Protracted conflict and insecurity in both Eritrea and DRC have caused long-term and large-scale displacement of millions of people. For decades, Eritreans have been crossing international borders to seek protection, establishing diaspora communities across the world. Connections with members of this diaspora facilitate the onward mobility of Eritreans over long distances. In contrast, most displaced Congolese flee within their own country, often maintaining direct connections with their communities of origin. The following examples underline that protracted displacement cannot always be equated with confinement, with immobility while in transit, or with individuals stuck in a particular place.[1]

Long-distance or onward-oriented mobility

When refugees are able to move legally to Europe or North America it is often either through a family reunification programme, or through a sponsor. Relatively little is known, however, about those who have not been able to resort to an international network or international organisations for support. They may nevertheless display high levels of mobility. Hassan is a good example. Now a married father of three children, he fled Eritrea during the war in 1987, remaining an irregular migrant for 15 years. He has been a recognised refugee now for 20 years and lives in an Ethiopian refugee camp with his family. His trajectory illustrates long-distance and long-term mobility and shows that this mobility is not necessarily reflected in legal and policy frameworks.

Hassan worked in a number of different jobs throughout his years of displacement: as a fisherman in Port Sudan, a charcoal maker in Puntland, a camel herder in Oman, a shopkeeper in Saudi Arabia, a ship cleaner in Dubai, and a day labourer in Yemen. He hid in a cargo ship headed to Australia and was discovered in Mombasa, Kenya. After being deported back to Somalia multiple times from the countries to which he had moved, he stopped pretending to be a Somali and was put on a plane to be deported to Eritrea in 2001. "I told them I was from Eritrea, because I was tired. [Before this] I always said I am Somali because I was afraid of Eritrea." After serving six months in the Eritrean army he escaped to Sudan, where he moved to a refugee camp and married another Eritrean refugee. "We left in 2008. It was not secure there. Eritrean forces took anyone [Eritreans] from the refugee camp [in Sudan]." He travelled with his family to the camp in Tigray where he has stayed since then. Throughout his irregular journeys Hassan was quite mobile, despite the lack of formal support or status, but each time he entered a camp he faced formal rules that impeded his mobility and that made him feel stuck. Mobility, on the other hand, provided him access to a wide range of livelihoods that enabled him to survive despite the lack of any formal assistance.

Medium- to short-distance, locally oriented mobility

Hassan's case shows that displaced persons on the one hand often succeed in mitigating risks and vulnerabilities by increasing their mobility. The fact that his mobility was often hampered by restrictive refugee policies illustrates on the other hand the de facto negative impact of such restraints. The recent liberalisation of Ethiopia's once restrictive policy, for example, now allows refugees to live outside the camps, which strengthened the position of refugees wishing to live outside the camps. It indeed expanded advantages where there already was a degree of informal flexibility at local level as the next case shows. Muhammed, an unmarried Eritrean from a family of fishermen, who is now in his early twenties, fled from Eritrea as a school student. At his first attempt to cross the border he was imprisoned but released after a few months thanks to his student status. He reached Afar state in Ethiopia on his second attempt with the help of nomads, where he settled in Loggia, a busy market town on the crossroads of regional trade routes.

Upon arrival, Muhammed made friends with other ethnic Afar who directed him to the Aysaita refugee camp. "[But] in the camp you do not get enough [food]", he explained. In Loggia by contrast, "… you have Ethiopian friends. You eat with them. They [Ethiopian Afar] even let me continue my studies [here]." Thanks to a high level of local solidarity, Muhammed has been able to enrol in a management studies course at the local university without any need for identity documents. After the new out-of-camp policy came into effect in Ethiopia he now has both a student and a refugee identity card. He can officially live and study in Loggia and get his monthly food rations in the camp without fear of being punished or caught for his prior irregular status. Muhammed shares the regular food rations from the camp with his hosts outside the camp, and the hosts do not have to worry about possible reprisals for sheltering him. Being a recognised refugee living out of camp,

on the contrary, made it possible to secure a reduction of his student fees. Muhammed benefits from the mobility options that are provided to him through his formal student status, but he is only able to take advantage of these options thanks to his embeddedness in an informal support network.

Backward-oriented mobility

Dewis is a Congolese man in his fifties, a married father of eight children. He originates from one of the rural areas in South Kivu province in the conflict-affected east of DRC. In 2012, when armed forces raped his sister-in-law and killed her husband, Dewis decided to flee to Bukavu, the provincial capital, located some 80km from Dewis' village. Upon arrival, Dewis noted that there was a high and often unmet demand for charcoal in the city so he decided to start a business in charcoal production in his area of origin, where forest resources are abundant. He transports the charcoal to the urban market, where his wife sells it. The business requires Dewis to return to his village about three times a month, enabling him to keep growing and harvesting crops while making a living from trade in the city.

Our research revealed that many IDPs like Dewis and his family frequently return to their respective places of origin despite the continuing insecurity there. It does not necessarily mean that they would return permanently if there was more stability. Our research showed that IDPs' livelihood strategies in displacement depend to a large extent on regular returns to their community of origin: for instance, to benefit from rural-urban trading opportunities, to harvest crops for the household's daily consumption, or to check on property. For many displaced people, it is essential to maintain mobility and assets in order both to cope with their present situation and to allow for a possible return in the future.

Immobility

While many displaced people rely on onward or backward mobility to rebuild their lives in displacement, there is a group of people that can neither make return visits to their community of origin, nor move elsewhere. For some, moving within the host country

or onward might be impeded by legal and policy frameworks that limit their freedom of movement. In circumstances where refugees lack the right to move freely, mobility usually entails illegality and loss of entitlement to formal support. There is a large number of people who have been driven into illegality because of this.

Apart from formal limitations, the dividing line between mobility and immobility is often determined by individual circumstances that are related to pre-displacement experiences. Kazi, for example, is very outspoken about the impossibility of returning to his home community in DRC.[2] Some years ago he was forcibly recruited into an armed group in his area of origin. After about six months in the bush, he managed to escape and flee to Bukavu. He then found that his relatives had taken him for dead, and that his wife had built a life without him, not knowing whether he would ever return. Not having a family to return to, combined with the stigma of having been part of an armed group (and the fear of being recruited again), makes return an unrealistic option for Kazi. He therefore remains in the city, where he is at least able to benefit from his brother's connections to make a living.

Kazi's case is not uncommon. In many cases, the displaced people we met could not return to their community of origin because they had lost all their assets in the community. This could be as a result of looting, or because relatives had appropriated everything in their absence. Relatives often refuse to return property or to compensate returnees, arguing that those who did not suffer the hardships of the war had lost their claim to assets in the village. There is also often a fear of stigmatisation prevalent among a particular group of displaced persons: namely women – and sometimes men – who have been raped. After this traumatic experience, they prefer the anonymity of their place of refuge to the prospect of discrimination upon return to their community of origin. This means that they also cannot turn to former contacts for support.

Fourth durable solution?

In the above, we have set out four different types of mobility that characterise everyday

Bada Admagug, in Afar State, Ethiopia. This is a central transport hub close to an irregular border crossing point with Eritrea. From here, goods and people move across the border and within the region.

heightened by aid policies that fail to acknowledge, assess and react to such realities. A lack of awareness that displaced people may need access to other options (such as enabling access to their fields or home communities while staying in camps) may lead not only to a failure of interventions but also to counterproductive effects, for instance by causing irregularity. In contrast, policies that support or at least do not inhibit the mobility patterns of displaced people – mobility patterns which they have established themselves and which have contributed to their livelihoods – were observed to be an effective and more sustainable way to overcome protracted displacement situations.

experiences of protracted displacement. Our empirical results show that mobility is an important part of displaced persons' livelihood strategies. In many cases, this mobility is made possible by virtue of informal connections, and happens despite formal policies. Impediments to mobility also impede people's livelihood opportunities. To categorise displaced persons as stuck has unintended negative impacts in practice. Those eligible to receive assistance as displaced people hide their mobility strategies in order not to jeopardise their access to assistance; coping mechanisms that are based on a degree of mobility remain unrecognised and are often hindered by regulations on aid provision; and mobile individuals must take risks associated with moving under the radar. There is always a risk of losing one's legal status, of extortion at road blocks or by smugglers, of losing belongings or merchandise, or of being kidnapped. All these factors make mobility a risky and costly endeavour. Displaced people have to weigh the costs and benefits when taking the decision to move.

According to our observations it is evident that the risks and vulnerabilities of those requiring protection may be

Measures to foster self-help mechanisms and to mitigate risks need to be tailor-made and needs-based. In the case of Dewis and Kazi, this would entail support for making a living in the city. Dewis could also benefit from improved and more secure road infrastructure. In Muhammed's and Hassan's cases, the benefits of legalising and supporting out-of-camp options for refugees are clear: legal status and continued access to aid improved their economic and social position, and resulted in less exploitation and discrimination. This, in sum, shows that putting people and the solutions they find for themselves before politics and top-down prescriptions could be a hybrid yet realistic fourth durable solution.

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1. Tufa et al (2021) 'Figurations of Displacement in and beyond Ethiopia', TRAFIG Working Paper No 5, BICC bit.ly/TRAFIG-WP5

2. For more detail about his case, see Jacobs et al (2020) 'Figurations of Displacement in the DRC', TRAFIG Working Paper No 4, BICC bit.ly/TRAFIG-WP4

Family networks and Syrian refugees' mobility aspirations

Sarah A Tobin, Fawwaz Momani, Tamara Adel Al Yakoub, and Rola Fares AlMassad

Syrian refugees' aspirations to move contradict the notion that those refugees who are 'stuck' in displacement are passive victims without agency. Rather, in the absence of viable options for physical mobility, refugees may still engage in aspirations to 'move on' even when they are not able to do so physically.

Sustaining local, regional and transnational family networks is a strategy that displaced persons use in order to cope in conditions of protracted displacement. These networks can help provide access to humanitarian aid, socio-economic resources, psychosocial support, and opportunities for mobility. But not always. In this article, we examine the protracted displacement of Syrian refugees in Jordan as they remain restricted from onward mobility yet use family networks to dream of moving outside the country, to move next to, to be among, or to reunite with family networks 'elsewhere'. However, these aspirations are almost always unrealised and remain idealised futures, 'imaginaries' of a life that is likely never to come to pass. Instead, they are practices that reinforce key family networks and assert the agency of the refugees in the context of being 'stuck' rather than serving as a realistic pathway to a durable solution.[1]

For the nearly one million Syrian refugees in Jordan, their stay has become increasingly protracted, with durable solutions – return in safety and dignity, local integration or third-country resettlement – remaining out of reach for nearly all. Fewer than 35,000 Syrians have returned from Jordan; Jordan continues to offer support to Syrians as 'guests' rather than long-term or permanent residents; and Syrian resettlement rates are very low, with only 176,000 having been resettled worldwide and only a small fraction of them coming from Jordan[2]. Our research indicates that only 16% had applied for asylum and resettlement outside Jordan.[3] Despite these odds many Syrians in Jordan continue to actively discuss their aspirations for onward mobility, despite it being extremely unlikely to become a reality.

I really want to move to Canada, or Britain, or America. They say the youth have abundant job opportunities available for them. And they have health insurance if they become sick. My sister is in America now; she has been there for four years. She says that life there is beautiful, except that being a foreigner is hard because she misses the family and her loved ones. Living there is great, especially when it comes to medical care. It's not like the hardships and sufferings people face here in Jordan. (Syrian refugee woman in Jordan)

Mobility aspirations reveal individuals' agency. They express desires for their own future, with a life with their family, in decent work, with educational opportunities and accessible, affordable healthcare. They articulate a vision for 'the good life' in which they can create a fulfilled and contented life in a country where the rule of law is the norm, rather than under an authoritarian regime. It is a future that contrasts strongly with the present, making aspiring towards such a markedly different future particularly challenging.

Furthermore, mobility aspirations reconnect and reinforce family networks through shared and imagined futures. Even – perhaps especially – when they are unable to meet in person, refugees use mobility aspirations to reinforce the importance and place of family networks and their members.

Imagining elsewhere

The United States of America, Canada, Europe (including the UK and Nordic countries) and Australia were the most popular relocation destinations chosen by

those whom we interviewed. Ninety percent said that they desired to connect with and rekindle family networks outside Jordan. Comments such as this were relatively common: "We are thinking of moving, but we cannot afford it. We have no single country in mind, but we would choose Britain if we could." Another said, "Britain is my favourite, but if I had the chance to move to another country such as Canada or Germany, I would." These ill-defined, even interchangeable, North American and European destinations were described to us with vague and idealised images of a better life and lifestyles, with gardens and parks, better work opportunities and pay, and good educational opportunities. One woman said, "I want my kids to go back to school. I cannot afford to send them to private schools in Jordan… I wish I could move to the West to get better education for my children." These kinds of sentiments were common among the Syrians we surveyed and interviewed.

These ideas often came from family members who were already living in these locations. Interviewees' comments were often prefaced with "My relatives already in Britain [or whichever country] tell us…" Through social media, phone calls and family networks, family members shared a picture of a life abroad that was perhaps painted in an overly positive light and which hid some of the disadvantages and challenges. For example, one said, "My cousin is in Denmark. She does not pay house rent. The government supports them with everything." This family member appears to have neglected to say that the Danish government has been particularly tough on Syrians, even threatening to forcibly return some.

These kinds of statements reveal little about migration intentions, but much about the transnationally embedded nature of these family networks. Such statements also reveal the ways in which refugees can and do exist in multiple places simultaneously: they reside physically in Jordan but imagine being closer to a much beloved family member, being taken care

of, and receiving relief from the grinding nature of life in protracted displacement in Jordan. As one said, "I wish I could make it to Canada… My sister in Canada has got citizenship after four years, and she says that life there is different. Her kids are all in schools; they are doing very well. Here in Jordan, it seems that I am losing my sons."

The Case of Umm-Baha
The case of Umm-Baha reveals the agent-centric nature of mobility aspirations, and the ways in which such practices reinforce family networks.

Umm-Baha is a married woman from Daraa, in southern Syria. She is in her late forties, has nine children and is a stay-at-home mother. When conflict began, she and her family considered going to Jordan, assuming they would return after two or three months. Jordan was the first choice because Umm-Baha's husband knew the country well from frequent travel there and it was the closest option. Umm-Baha's husband and four oldest sons began preparing for the journey to Jordan; she and the rest of the children would follow later.

Umm-Baha's decisions about mobility were dictated by fear for her children's safety: she was afraid to stay in Syria with them, afraid to make the journey and endanger them, and afraid to be somewhere new where she would be unable to help them as they needed. As a result, she did not want to leave Syria. However, she changed her mind when one of her daughters was sexually assaulted, and several of her sons were arrested by the Assad regime. After their release, Umm-Baha's sons became more determined to leave for Jordan.

Initially Umm-Baha and five of her children settled near Irbid in northern Jordan, their rent paid for by the Norwegian Refugee Council. They would have liked to live closer to the city centre but the rent, water and electricity were too expensive; on the recommendations of relatives, they moved to the nearby city of Ramtha. Eight of the nine children now live in Ramtha, and Umm-Baha's husband,

parents and siblings are there, all within a five-minute walk from each other.

Despite the close presence of a large extended family in Jordan, Umm-Baha dreams regularly about a better life outside Jordan. Economic conditions in Jordan are hard, and the family must work together to make ends meet. Her sister, brother-in-law and their children were resettled in the US, and they keep in touch. This prompts her to think about possibilities for improving her own life as well. When asked if she intends to stay in Jordan, she said, "No. There is not a good life for my boys here. I am thinking of a country other than Syria with a better place for my boys." However, any real possibilities for onward migration are thwarted because her oldest married son refuses to travel to Europe, and her grandchildren would not be eligible to go with her due to family reunification restrictions. Umm-Baha is worried that any onward migration would split the family apart.

At one point, Umm-Baha collected information from family and friends who are in the US, attempting to make her mobility aspirations a reality. They advised her to join them, and so she asked her family members in those countries to submit the paperwork for family reunification. But then, as she says, "I noticed that they apologised and deferred and said 'it's too long and complicated'. Our relationships have grown distant. I keep asking UNHCR about it. But they said our request in the queue."

As the story of Umm-Baha demonstrates, mobility is not a straightforward and linear trajectory shaped merely by the presence of family. Rather, mobilities are anchored in past experiences, subject to present realities, and informed by future hopes and imagined scenarios. People's mobilities are shaped also by which type of family network they wish to cultivate, and their perceptions of the role of knowledge sharing and trust within those family networks.

Conclusions

Discussions about protracted displacement, mobility and durable solutions often pay little attention to the desires, imaginations and aspirations of the refugees themselves. However, "migration imaginaries"[4] merit attention because they are widely participated in by all refugees and reveal much about ways of being and belonging, especially with regard to family networks. They also reveal the ways in which individuals become active protagonists in the context of protracted displacement, where their agency might otherwise be constrained or stifled.

Resettlement is a durable option but it is available to very few. In the absence of a viable durable option, mobility may exist in multiple places and spaces at the same time. Mobility aspirations enable the actor to contract or expand their family networks at will, without financial costs. Additional research is needed to establish to what extent mobility aspirations have positive outcomes that extend beyond the refugee or family networks in areas that may include improved mental health or physical well-being.

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1. Some of the arguments made in this article are further explored in Tobin S A, Etzold B, Momani F, Al Yakoub T A, AlMassad R F and Shdefat A G (forthcoming) 'Ambivalent entanglements: Syrian refugees' network relations and (im)mobilities in protracted displacement' in Ahrens J and King R (Eds) *Onward Migration and Multi-sited Transnationalism: Complex Trajectories, Practices and Ties*, Cham: Springer.

2. *Resettlement at a Glance: January-December 2019* bit.ly/UNHCR-resettlement-2019

3. Tobin S A et al (2020) 'Figurations of Displacement in Jordan and beyond: Empirical findings and reflections on protracted displacement and translocal connections of Syrian refugees', TRAFIG Working Paper No 6, BICC bit.ly/TRAFIG-WP6

4. Bolognani M (2016) 'From myth of return to return fantasy: a psychosocial interpretation of migration imaginaries', *Identities* 23(2):193–209 https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2015.1031670

'Constrained mobility': a feature of protracted displacement in Greece and Italy

Panos Hatziprokopiou, Evangelia Papatzani, Ferruccio Pastore and Emanuela Roman

People living in protracted displacement in Italy and Greece are frequently more mobile than is generally recognised in public discourse and policy.

Protracted displacement is often implicitly associated with passivity and immobility, and it is not by chance that protracted displacement is often described through the metaphor of 'limbo'. But people living in protracted displacement are far from immobile. On the contrary, both in their everyday lives and over time, they experience 'constrained mobility' at different scales (from local to transnational) and in pursuit of different goals (primarily subsistence and administrative status). While heavily constrained by a complex and constantly evolving combination of legal and socio-economic factors, these mobility patterns are a crucial form of 'agency under duress'.

In this article, we use the cases of Greece and Italy to explore what protracted displacement looks like in reality. These countries share at least three common structural features. First, both are 'first entry' countries in the European Union (EU), where asylum seekers' mobility is constrained by Dublin Regulation rules. Second, both countries have comparatively low administrative capacity, in particular in the fields of reception and integration of asylum seekers and refugees. Finally, they are both characterised by stagnant official labour markets and sizeable underground economies. All of these factors deeply shape the patterns of (im)mobility and inclusion/exclusion of migrants living in protracted displacement.

Immobilising effects of EU and national regulations

Intra-EU mobility constitutes a major challenge for both asylum seekers and protection beneficiaries[1] in Italy and Greece. For asylum seekers, secondary movement within the EU is often (although not

exclusively) motivated by family reasons. The Dublin Regulation represents a massive obstacle, especially for adult asylum seekers who have family members in other EU countries whom they would like to join. Often these relatives do not fall under the Regulation's strict definition of 'family', which includes only the applicant's spouse or children (under the age of 18). Even when asylum seekers are allowed to move within the EU (as in the case of unaccompanied minors), they face extremely long waiting times and many administrative obstacles. For protection beneficiaries holding an Italian or Greek residence permit, and who are able to obtain travel documents, EU law allows them to move freely across the EU for no more than three months – although many opt to overstay this period, accepting the risk this carries.

However, there are deep differences between the two countries as regards mobility between countries, especially for asylum seekers. While both countries have adopted the 'hotspot' approach, in Greece – where it was introduced in conjunction with the 2016 EU–Turkey deal – it has become a key mechanism of migration control, turning the country into an internal EU 'buffer zone'. Migration journeys were interrupted, both to other member States but also within the country itself. This is because asylum seekers' mobility in Greece is directly impacted by the different types of reception facilities and procedures, which in Greece have three distinct forms: a) the forced containment of asylum seekers in hotspots on five eastern Aegean islands until a decision is reached on their asylum claims (with some exceptions); b) asylum seekers' accommodation in isolated 'open temporary accommodation sites' (camps) on the mainland, subject to specific regulations and mobility restrictions; and

c) the accommodation of the most vulnerable in urban apartments.[2] Mobility across these reception facilities is strictly regulated.

In contrast, asylum seekers do not stay in hotspots in southern Italy while their asylum applications are examined but are instead dispersed to reception centres across the country. Their mobility is regulated less strictly than in Greece, although those hosted in reception centres similarly risk losing their accommodation if they are absent for a prolonged period without permission. For asylum seekers and protection beneficiaries who are no longer in the reception system, onward movement within the country is extremely common.

Constrained mobility as a survival strategy

In both countries, migrants living in protracted displacement develop a wide range of mobility-based survival strategies permitting them to navigate the complex asylum systems at both national and EU levels in order to reunite with their networks, meet their basic needs or seek better opportunities elsewhere.

Asylum seekers in Greece may for instance attempt to escape from the islands to the mainland, or to move from their officially allotted camp to another, where they usually remain unregistered. They may also travel for seasonal work (running the risk of losing their camp accommodation and financial assistance if their employment becomes known) or they may remain official residents of the camp but actually move to a rented apartment in the city.

For migrants living in protracted displacement in Italy, regardless of their legal and administrative status, mobility within the country represents a major survival strategy. This is typically an employment-driven circular mobility, with migrants following employment opportunities across the country (for example, seasonal agricultural workers who follow the harvest seasons).

Intra-European movements may take different forms, depending on integration prospects (however limited), labour market opportunities (however precarious), and political geography itself (with Italy bordering three other Schengen countries while Greece borders none). Overall, 'secondary movements' are widely practised, even when not strictly legal. Intra-EU mobility from Italy, in particular, is usually a 'two-way' path with frequent back-and-forth movements; movements from Greece, by contrast, are mainly 'one-way'.

It is very common for protection beneficiaries in Italy to move to another EU country, find an informal job and settle irregularly. This subsistence migration is circular, involving periodic returns to renew their Italian residence permit (every two or five years, depending on the form of protection granted). However, in order to renew the permit, an official residential address in Italy is needed. As migrants rarely have such an address, a profitable illegal market has developed to provide fake documents. This situation is often defined by migrants themselves as a 'trap' whereby, in order to remain 'legal' in country A, one has to stay irregularly in country B and resort to illegal activities.

Similarly, intra-EU mobility is widespread among protection beneficiaries in Greece, triggered by harsh living conditions and limited integration prospects, and also related to where forced migrants have networks in the places they wish to reach. Some migrants attempt to entirely avoid the asylum system's immobilising effects from the very beginning, for instance by crossing the northeastern land border with Turkey. Such a strategy enables them to avoid being identified by State officials and prohibited from onward travel, and to cross subsequent borders irregularly (supported by illegal markets providing housing and fake documents). Similar channels may be used to later pursue legal mobility routes: a spouse, or even children, may be smuggled to relatives in a northern European country, in order to allow, at a later stage, asylum applicants in Greece to reunite with family members under Dublin. A paradox thus arises, by which irregularity allows mobility whereas 'legality' actually prevents it.

The additional immobilising effects of COVID-19

COVID-19 restrictions produced further disruptions of mobility at different levels: within Italy and Greece, across the EU and to/from countries of origin or transit. Measures restricting mobility and imposing social distancing had an especially heavy impact on migrants living in protracted displacement, with those hosted in reception facilities subject to increased prohibitions and controls. Almost all transfers, entries and exits from the asylum system were suspended, and migrants lost their limited educational and recreational opportunities, and their meagre sources of income.

Travel bans and border closures led to a drop in transits to other European destinations. In the Italian case, during the first wave, the complete freezing of secondary intra-EU and internal mobility deprived seasonal agricultural workers of their only means of subsistence, impoverishing them further. At the same time, those who found themselves temporarily outside the country (whether elsewhere in Europe or in the countries of origin) were then stuck and could not return.

The constrained mobility strategies described above became impracticable in both countries, transforming life into "a sort of hyper-limbo, where the usual levels of immobilisation and marginalisation are enhanced by COVID-related restrictions", as an interviewee in Rome told us.

Policy implications and future outlook

The important role that constrained mobility has in shaping everyday lives and prospects of migrants living in protracted displacement in Greece and Italy is either ignored or stigmatised by official policy discourse. It is ignored as long as mobility takes place under the radar of the media and regulatory agencies, as is usually the

Mória refugee camp, Lesvos (Greece), 2018.

Eva (Evangelia) Papatzani

case with seasonal employment-driven movements within receiving States. However, when constrained mobility takes place across State borders it quickly becomes a target for media stigmatisation and administrative obstructionism (or even criminalisation). This is counterproductive, as it neglects the potential of mobility as a resource capable of mitigating suffering and reducing the losses experienced by people living in protracted displacement. Such mobility may even be seen as a 'fourth durable solution', as suggested elsewhere in this special feature.

However much it may be needed, a different and more positive attitude towards migrants' mobility would require overcoming massive political obstacles at both the domestic and European level. It is difficult to normalise and facilitate employment-driven circular mobility – for example, by providing proper housing, registered residence and health assistance on agricultural sites – because of the largely irregular and highly exploitative nature of employment in these sectors, both in Italy and in Greece. A step forward could be to relax the excessive controls and prohibitions over asylum seekers' mobility while in reception facilities.

A strategy which recognises and enables intra-EU cross-border mobility faces even bigger obstacles due to the entrenched resistance of most member States to any legalisation of such movements. This was clear during the disrupting (but revealing) legal and political battle over the EU's 2015 relocation schemes. The undocumented status of a large proportion of migrants living in protracted displacement is an even more serious political hurdle.[3] For this especially vulnerable cohort of people, some form of collective amnesty or case-by-case regularisation procedure would be necessary before any pragmatic reflection on facilitating mobility could begin. However, there is currently very little appetite among EU governments to pursue this option. Unless these political hurdles can be tackled it may be pointless to explore different potential technical solutions (such as complementary pathways, intra-EU job search visas, and free movement for protection beneficiaries).[4]

Finally, it is worth commenting that there is now growing awareness of the risk posed when marginalised migrants, especially if undocumented, are not effectively included in COVID-19 vaccination campaigns.[5] In addition to leaving migrants unprotected, slower and lower-than-average vaccine coverage may also increase the risk of migrants being scapegoated as potential vectors of virus variants and future waves of contagion. Targeted efforts to ensure vaccine equity are therefore critically important to avoid further marginalisation, additional immobilisation and an overall worsening of protracted displacement.

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1. People who have been granted 'international protection' status (including both refugee status and subsidiary protection) or national-based complementary forms of protection (which in Italy are mainly used).

2. The ESTIA accommodation programme provides (temporary) housing in rented apartments in Greek cities to the most vulnerable asylum seekers until one month after their asylum claim decision. From late 2020, its management gradually shifted from UNHCR to the Greek government and since January 2021 the programme (renamed ESTIA 21) has been entirely managed by the Greek government. http://estia.unhcr.gr/en/

3. A 2019 study estimated the number of undocumented migrants living in the EU in 2017 at between 3.9 and 4.8 million, about half residing in Germany and the UK alone. https://pewrsr.ch/3neyKQw

4. Wagner M and Katsiaficas C (2021) 'Networks and mobility: A case for complementary pathways', TRAFIG Policy Brief No 3 bit.ly/2X4L8Ig

5. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (2021) 'Reducing COVID 19 transmission and strengthening vaccine uptake among migrant populations in the EU/EEA' bit.ly/3jVxwYC

Humanitarian Admission Programmes: how networks enable mobility in contexts of protracted displacement

Benjamin Etzold and Simone Christ

Recent research explored how refugees make use of their networks to escape from protracted displacement. Germany's Humanitarian Admission Programmes have been able to provide legal 'complementary' pathways for Syrian refugees who had transnational ties. The effectiveness and reach of these schemes, however, are constrained by various factors.

Humanitarian Admission Programmes (HAPs) can play an important role as 'complementary pathways' for refugees out of protracted displacement, as shown in initiatives by the German government and its federal states during the Syrian war. Such initiatives are particularly effective if they build on refugees' social networks.[1] Within the framework of the HAPs set up by German federal states, displaced people could rely on long-established transnational connections. For example, those who had previously migrated to Germany were able to help other family members to take advantage of private and community sponsorship schemes in order to come to Germany. However, there are limits to the potential of these network-based schemes to be fruitful 'complementary pathways' out of protracted displacement, the most obvious limit being their sole focus on Syrians and the neglect of other nationals.[2]

Private sponsorship

At the end of 2010, 30,000 Syrian nationals were living in Germany. By the end of 2020 there were more than 818,000 Syrians in the country. After the outbreak of conflict in Syria, many German residents were looking to bring family members still in Syria to safety. Initially, a substantial number of Syrians came to Germany via different legal pathways, as students and tourists, on work visas and through family reunification, and many (though not all) also applied for asylum after their arrival.[3] As both political persecution and the violent conflict in Syria worsened, it became clear that the existing legal pathways could only be used by a

small minority of those who had a personal affiliation with Germany and who needed protection. The humanitarian situation in Syria's refugee-hosting neighbours also worsened, meaning that hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees needed longer-term prospects that were often not available in countries of first reception. The number of Syrian refugees who were resettled to third countries remained critically low and the number of those who irregularly crossed the external borders of the European Union steadily increased. In response to this, there was a call for new legal frameworks that would allow onward mobility for Syrian refugees at risk of protracted displacement.

In this critical period, the German government set up a Humanitarian Admission Programme through which 19,000 Syrian nationals could enter Germany via a safe and legal route between 2013 and 2015. In addition, several German federal states created their own programmes through which almost 24,000 Syrian nationals arrived in Germany between 2013 and 2017.[4] The HAPs set up by the German government and its federal states had a distinct selection criterion: they built on Syrian refugees' own networks, allowing mobility to Germany based on existing ties to the country, either through close family relationships or through proven prior stays in the country.

However, this route was still not open to all who had transnational kin relations or previous migration experience. Only close family members of German residents (parents, children and siblings, but not uncles, aunts and cousins) could be registered for these

admission programmes. After registration, Syrians migrants in Germany had to sign a 'declaration of commitment' to guarantee to cover travel costs and provide adequate accommodation and costs of living (with the exception of health insurance which was covered by the state). These commitments released the German state of its responsibility to cover all the costs. Once declarations were signed and a visa (providing two-year temporary residence) was issued by the German embassy in the respective country of first reception, the Syrian refugees could then travel to Germany by plane. While the whole process took only few weeks in some cases, others waited for up to two years due to the overly bureaucratic process or because they lacked documents. Signing the declaration of commitment was challenging for those who were themselves in a precarious economic situation and could not provide the necessary financial guarantees. Many then turned to local solidarity networks such as church groups or refugee activists and asked if they could provide the guarantees and bear the travel, resettlement and initial living costs for their relatives. Some Syrians managed to bring in several relatives but subsequently felt both financially and psychologically overburdened as their family members were so dependent on them.

Moving on through transnational networks
The cases of Abdulrahem and Suli point to the central importance both of transnational family networks and of local networks of solidarity and support in order to facilitate humanitarian admission and avoid life-threatening irregular journeys to Europe.

Abdulraheem, a Syrian man in his forties, worked as an accountant at a private company. He had always been critical of the Syrian government and had been persecuted by the secret services, even before the war had started. In early 2014, he fled with his wife and two children to a city in Eastern Turkey. They lived in a small flat using their own savings, as they had no other income. The only potential way out of this protracted situation was through his sister, who had been living in Germany since 2005 and who suggested

that they join her there. Abdulraheem's sister found out about North Rhine-Westphalia's HAP. As she could not provide the financial guarantees for all family members that she wanted to bring to safety, she asked a local group of volunteers for support. In the end, she and her husband signed the required 'declarations of commitment' for four people, while four volunteers from a church group – all Germans – signed four further guarantees. In total, eight people had the chance to travel to Germany in 2015 via a safe route. Other members of the extended family were not able to follow through the HAP and instead came to Germany via irregular pathways (via Turkey, Greece, the Western Balkans and Austria). Abdulraheem emphasised that while family support reaches across borders, ultimately living in one place was "very important […] We have to stick together".

Suli, a Syrian woman in her early twenties, grew up in Aleppo, where she graduated from university in 2012. Soon after, she had to flee with her parents and four siblings to their family's village of origin close to the Turkish border. When the civil war reached that region as well, Suli and her family crossed the border to Turkey in the summer of 2013, temporarily settling in a city in the south east. For Suli, the connections with her cousin Lya paved the way to a 'third-country solution' for her family. Lya's family had moved to Germany in the 1990s but frequently visited Syria during the summers. With Lya's help, Suli obtained a study visa and flew to Germany with a temporary residence permit. She lived with her cousin's family in a city in North Rhine-Westphalia but was still separated from her own parents and siblings. As she had just turned 18 and was therefore no longer a minor, however, the regular family reunification procedures did not provide options for her family to follow her to Germany. Her 17-year-old brother then embarked on a journey facilitated by smugglers via the eastern Mediterranean and western Balkan route, and joined an uncle in Switzerland. Her parents and younger siblings did not want to risk this dangerous route and remained in Turkey. In early 2014, Suli learned about the HAP in North Rhine-

UNHCR/Chris Melzer

Syrian teenager reunited with his family in Germany after three years apart.

nationals benefitted from the various HAPs set up by the German government and its federal states. In contrast to the insecure irregular journeys along the Eastern Mediterranean, which approximately 1.2 million people made between 2013 and 2017 in order to reach Europe, the German HAPs were indeed a humanitarian solution that provided a promising pathway out of protractedness. However, five key caveats remained:

Firstly, the HAPs were only temporary. After 2015, the German government did not prolong its programme despite the ongoing need. Instead, humanitarian admission continued under different conditions after the controversial 2016 EU–Turkey deal: resettlement procedures that focused on particularly vulnerable refugees were implemented and 10,000 Syrian nationals were flown from Turkey to Germany between 2017 and 2020. Existing family affiliations to Germany were not a selection criterion and German residents could not name relatives at risk of protracted displacement in Turkey to be included in these resettlements. As the political climate had changed, only six federal states continued their HAPs – and these offered only a limited number of places to German residents' family members.[5]

Secondly, the more recent HAPs[6] have always been limited to Syrian nationals. Other nationalities, such as Afghan, Iraqi, Somali and Eritrean refugees, who have also experienced protracted displacement, were never included in the design of HAPs that are sensitive to existing networks ties. This is despite the fact that many refugees from these countries also maintain strong transnational family relations to German residents or have other proven ties to the country.

Westphalia and registered her parents, only to learn that the available places – 5,000 at that time – had already been filled. In autumn 2014, a new phase of the programme was opened and Suli registered her parents and siblings again. Due to her temporary status and lack of funds, she could not sign the required declaration of commitment herself but after almost a year she found private sponsors from a local church community. A few weeks later her parents and younger siblings received their visas at the German embassy in Ankara and arrived in Germany by plane in September 2015.

Safe pathways for a few

Between 2013 and 2017, the number of resettlement places available in Germany was minimal – 3,000 individuals (of which only 44% were Syrians) were resettled in this period – and other legal pathways such as student and work visas and family reunification were not viable options for tens of thousands of Syrians. During the same period, around 44,000 Syrian

Thirdly, there is a socio-economic bias in the design of network-sensitive HAPs as they privilege refugees with strong transnational relations and those comparatively well-off family networks that have sufficient financial means to provide guarantees for their relatives. Less wealthy Syrians who were not supported by local solidarity groups either could not facilitate their family members' safe and legal journey via the HAP or did manage to but then faced economic ruin after their relatives' arrival in Germany due to their financial responsibility for their relatives.

Fourthly, in Germany, the duration of the 'declaration of commitment' was much debated, including the question of whether it is the responsibility of the private sponsors (mostly family members) or the State to pay for the costs of living in the first years after arrival. This issue was resolved with the introduction of the German 'integration law' in 2016,[7] but it also shows some of the difficulties that arise in private sponsorship schemes. Whenever States involve sponsors in refugee reception, and particularly if private or community sponsorship becomes obligatory for admission, there is the risk that States seek to circumvent their duty to provide protection to displaced persons by outsourcing risks and by privatising the costs of refugee admission and integration.

Fifthly, the HAPs were initiated and facilitated by different state bodies – the German federal government and 15 out of 16 federal states – and had quite different rules and timelines. This multiplicity of actors and programmes created overcomplicated administrative procedures and, more importantly, led to a confusing variety of beneficiaries' legal rights (such as access to state benefits, housing, work, education and permanent residency) and sponsors' obligations. A standardised, coordinated and more generous approach would have been required to scale up humanitarian admission to Germany, but was not politically viable at that time.[8]

The experience from the German HAPs during the early years of the Syrian war show that networks can enable refugees' mobility out of protracted displacement.

Humanitarian admissions schemes that include elements of private and/or community sponsorship, and thus pay due attention to refugees' familial and personal networks, can thus fulfill their potential as viable 'complementary pathways' to protection. But their shortcomings need to be addressed.

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1. For a further discussion of the role of networks in facilitating refugees' movements to third countries see Wagner M and Katsiaficas C (2021) 'Networks and mobility: A case for complementary pathways', TRAFIG Policy Brief No 3 https://trafig.eu/output/policy-briefs/policy-brief-no-3.

2. This article draws on 58 qualitative interviews with Syrian, Afghan and Eritrean refugees, one focus group discussion with resettled refugees, plus 12 interviews with experts, conducted between August 2020 and March 2021 in Germany. Full results are presented in Christ S et al (2021) 'Figurations of Displacement in and beyond Germany. Empirical findings and reflections on mobility and translocal connections of refugees living in Germany', TRAFIG Working Paper No 10 https://trafig.eu/output/working-papers.

3. The number of foreigners, including Syrian nationals, living in Germany is available from DESTATIS, Germany's statistical office (Code 12521) www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online. According to the government's annual 'migration report', the share of visas issued to Syrian nationals for study, work or family reasons decreased substantially between 2010 and 2014, while both the share and absolute number of visas issued for humanitarian reasons and the temporary residency permits issued for the duration of the asylum procedure increased from 50 to 75%. bit.ly/BAMF-migration-report

4. There is contrasting information on the number of people who actually arrived via HAPs in this timeframe. The figures here are based on information provided by the German Federal Agency for Migration and Asylum (BAMF) in 2017. bit.ly/BAMF-HAP-2017

5. For an up-to-date list of federal states that currently have HAPs and most recent arrival statistics, see https://resettlement.de/landesaufnahme/ and https://resettlement.de/aktuelle-aufnahmen/.

6. At the federal level, there were HAPs for refugees from Vietnam in the 1970s, for refugees from Bosnia in the 1990s, and for Iraqis in 2009/10.

7 See BAMF (2017/2018) 'Migration, Integration, Asylum: Political Developments in Germany 2017', Annual Policy Report by the German National Contact Point for the European Migration Network bit.ly/BAMF-policy-report-2017

8. For a more detailed discussion of the differences between the federal and the state-level HAPs as well as Germany's resettlement schemes, and the variations of legal rights and obligations of the beneficiaries, see Tometten C (2018) 'Resettlement, Humanitarian Admission, and Family Reunion. The Intricacies of Germany's Legal Entry Regimes for Syrian Refugees', *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 37 (2), S. 187–203. DOI: 10.1093/rsq/hdy002.

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